@techreport{b1170d633b0a4628a7981da01bc841fe,
title = "Expectational Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models with Contracts - A Reformulation of Competitive Equilibrium",
abstract = "We introduce the notion of expectational equilibrium in a very general specification of the many-to-one matching with contracts model. The endogenous variables in an expectational equilibrium are expectations about tradable contracts. Expectational equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to stable outcomes. Substitutability of preferences is a sufficient condition for existence. Expectational equilibrium unifies all the other approaches used in the literature so far, in particular Walrasian equilibrium, Dr{\`e}ze equilibrium, and market clearing cutoffs. It also applies to cases where contracts do not involve money as well as cases where there is a smallest monetary unit of account.",
keywords = "Matching, Competitive equilibrium, Stable outcomes, Expectational Equilibrium",
author = "Herings, {P. Jean-Jacques}",
year = "2020",
month = jul,
day = "2",
doi = "10.26481/umagsb.2020018",
language = "English",
series = "GSBE Research Memoranda",
publisher = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
number = "018",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
}