Abstract
We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, provided that the set of players is finite or countably infinite and the action sets are finite. The proof relies on techniques from stochastic games and from alternating-move games with Borel-measurable payoffs.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Article number | e2105867119 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
Volume | 119 |
Issue number | 11 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 15 Mar 2022 |
Keywords
- repeated games
- Nash equilibrium
- countably many players
- tail-measurable payoffs
- 2-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES