Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs

G. Ashkenazi-Golan, J. Flesch, A. Predtetchinski, E. Solan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, provided that the set of players is finite or countably infinite and the action sets are finite. The proof relies on techniques from stochastic games and from alternating-move games with Borel-measurable payoffs.
Original languageEnglish
Article numbere2105867119
Number of pages8
JournalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Volume119
Issue number11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Mar 2022

Keywords

  • repeated games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • countably many players
  • tail-measurable payoffs
  • 2-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES

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