Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core

S. Maus*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


A replica theorem is shown to hold for exchange economies with asymmetric information. In a replicated exchange economy with asymmetric information the set of all core elements with equal treatment is nonempty, but it is in general only a subset of the core. Nevertheless, the replica theorem and the presence of at least one core element with equal treatment suffice to show existence of a competitive quasi-equilibrium. Conditions on the initial endowments and the communication system are given to ensure that every competitive quasi-equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)395-418
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number24
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2004

JEL classifications

  • c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
  • d50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
  • d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"

Cite this