### Abstract

We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information with respect to the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation,

i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies)

for any preference profile.

i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies)

for any preference profile.

Original language | English |
---|---|

Place of Publication | Maastricht |

Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |

Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2013 |

### Publication series

Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
---|---|

Number | 049 |

### Cite this

Peters, H. J. M., Schröder, M. J. W., & Vermeulen, A. J. (2013).

*Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions*. Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics. GSBE Research Memoranda, No. 049