Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions

H.J.M. Peters, M.J.W. Schröder, A.J. Vermeulen

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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Abstract

We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information with respect to the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation,
i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies)
for any preference profile.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMaastricht
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013

Cite this

Peters, H. J. M., Schröder, M. J. W., & Vermeulen, A. J. (2013). Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions. Maastricht: Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics.
Peters, H.J.M. ; Schröder, M.J.W. ; Vermeulen, A.J. / Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions. Maastricht : Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics, 2013.
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Peters, HJM, Schröder, MJW & Vermeulen, AJ 2013 'Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions' Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics, Maastricht.

Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions. / Peters, H.J.M.; Schröder, M.J.W.; Vermeulen, A.J.

Maastricht : Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics, 2013.

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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Peters HJM, Schröder MJW, Vermeulen AJ. Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions. Maastricht: Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics. 2013 Jan 1.