Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions

H.J.M. Peters; M.J.W. Schröder; A.J. Vermeulen

doi:10.26481/umagsb.2013049

Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions

H.J.M. Peters, M.J.W. Schröder, A.J. Vermeulen

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

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Abstract

We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information with respect to the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation,
i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies)
for any preference profile.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Maastricht
Publisher	Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2013049
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2013

Publication series

Series	GSBE Research Memoranda
Number	049

Access to Document

10.26481/umagsb.2013049

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Cite this

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