Abstract
This chapter deals with the meaning of independence in the context of EU agencies and the relationship with control and accountability mechanisms. The analysis highlights that agencies’ dependence very much depends on the specific context in which they operate and legal requirements placed on agencies. It confirms the myth of complete independence of European agencies: EU agencies are ‘in-betweeners’. It pointsto the problems as regards the independence of agencies, particularly in relation to political, Member State and market influence, and agencies’ accountability. It emphasizes the
need to develop a general legal concept of independence to safeguard the independence of agencies from industry, political and national interest, taking account of and accommodating the diversity of agency designs and tasks and recognizing the composite executive power at EU level.
need to develop a general legal concept of independence to safeguard the independence of agencies from industry, political and national interest, taking account of and accommodating the diversity of agency designs and tasks and recognizing the composite executive power at EU level.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Independence and legitimacy in the institutional system of the European Union |
| Editors | D. Ritleng |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 206-227 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-01-9876-979-8 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Publication series
| Series | The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law |
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