@article{e2ce7abb85694bf1bc5a9759e8a9933d,
title = "Equilibrium in two-player stochastic games with shift-invariant payoffs",
abstract = "We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets, and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an e-equilibrium for all e>0.",
keywords = "Equilibrium, Shift-invariant payoff, Stochastic game",
author = "J{\'a}nos Flesch and Eilon Solan",
note = "Funding Information: We thank Nicolas Vieille for useful discussions, Krishnendu Chatterjee and Itzhak Gilboa for pointing us to classes of shift-invariant evaluations, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments that substantially improved the presentation. This work has been partly supported by COST Action CA16228 European Network for Game Theory. Solan acknowledges the support of the Israel Science Foundation , grants # 217/17 and # 211/22 . data source: no data used",
year = "2023",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/j.matpur.2023.09.002",
language = "English",
volume = "179",
pages = "68--122",
journal = "Journal de Mathematiques Pures et Appliquees",
issn = "0021-7824",
publisher = "Elsevier Masson s.r.l.",
}