Abstract
In many models of resource allocation, agents are characterized by certain rights, needs, or demands. We impose the requirement that all agents who are not fully compensated are assigned the same amount, and explore it in the models of claims problems, division problems with single-peaked preferences, and division problems with single-dipped preferences. In combination with other properties, we obtain respective axiomatizations of the well-known constrained equal awards rule, the well-known uniform rule, and two families of rules for the single-dipped model.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 102411 |
Journal | Mathematical Social Sciences |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 1 Jan 2025 |
JEL classifications
- d63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
Keywords
- axiomatic analysis
- constrained equal awards rule
- equal treatment of unsatisfied agents
- resource allocation
- uniform rule