Abstract
In many models of resource allocation, agents are characterized by certain rights,
needs, or demands. We impose the requirement that all agents who are not fully
compensated are assigned the same amount, and explore it in the models of claims
problems, division problems with single-peaked preferences, and division problems with single-dipped preferences. In combination with other well-known properties, we obtain respective axiomatizations of the well- known constrained equal awards rule, the uniform rule, and two families of rules for the single-dipped model.
needs, or demands. We impose the requirement that all agents who are not fully
compensated are assigned the same amount, and explore it in the models of claims
problems, division problems with single-peaked preferences, and division problems with single-dipped preferences. In combination with other well-known properties, we obtain respective axiomatizations of the well- known constrained equal awards rule, the uniform rule, and two families of rules for the single-dipped model.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 19 Aug 2024 |
Publication series
| Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
|---|---|
| Number | 010 |
| ISSN | 2666-8807 |
JEL classifications
- d63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
Keywords
- resource allocation
- equal treatment of unsatisfied agents
- axiomatic analysis
- constrained equal awards rule
- uniform rule