Entre el supranacionalismo y el intergubernamentalismo en la política exterior de la unión Europea: Una aproximación “agente principal” en la política de sanciones en el marco de referencia de la PESC

Integration in the EU Foreign Policy domain has been sporadic, preventing the EU from gaining traction internationally. However, the imposition of international sanctions has generated a great degree of member state cooperation at the EU level. From establishing a common sanctioning practice, to institutionalising the instrument as part of the CFSP toolbox, the EU sanction policy constitutes a fascinating example of delegation of foreign policy powers from the national to the supranational level. This article uses the Principal-Agent model in an attempt to make evident, as a result from the allocation of such powers to the EU, the power struggle between the national and supranational levels for the control of the sanction-making process. The analysis reveals that in spite of EU supranational bodies acquiring greater control over time, the member states have set up control mechanisms in order to limit the room for manoeuvre of the former.