Enforcement condiviso in contesti multilivello. Italia e Unione Europea nella Politica comune della pesca. (Shared Enforcement of the European Regulation Facing Political Accountability: Italy and the Common Fisheries Policy. With English summary.)

Studies on the effectiveness of regulation are increasingly focusing their attention on all phases of decisionmaking. With regard to European regulation, most gaps in effectiveness occur during implementation, so far the competence of Member States. To strengthen its own intervention and to provide European regulation with more effectiveness, EU institutions are increasingly acquiring direct enforcement powers. Regarding the effects of this growing shared enforcement, a preliminary question is whether such mechanisms raise any problems with regard to democratic accountability, which is, as a matter of common knowledge, a long-standing concern for European institutions and governance. The CFP is a suitable example of this trend towards more direct action by the EU in enforcing regulation, where, though, mechanisms of accountability have not undergone changes accordingly. The paper takes mechanisms of shared enforcement within the CFP into account, to assess whether they rely on adequate mechanisms of political accountability, therefore displaying gaps that cast some shadow on the legitimacy itself of the way shared enforcement policies are set up, and on the system of European citizens' protection.