Endogenous information and stochastic contracts

Stefan Terstiege*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


A growing literature analyzes revenue-maximizing contracts for situations in which agents can acquire private information before they decide whether to join the contract. It is conjectured that the results also apply to the more natural scenario where information can be acquired either before or after signing. This paper shows that, in fact, the latter scenario is more favorable for the principal. Using stochastic contracts, she can induce information acquisition with some probability and yet appropriate the generated surplus. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)535-547
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

JEL classifications

  • d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
  • d83 - "Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief"
  • d86 - Economics of Contract: Theory


  • principal agent
  • information acquisition
  • Stochastic contracts


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