Efficient Solutions to Bargaining Problems with Uncertain Disagreement Points

W. Bossert*, H.J.M. Peters

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

206 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of the disagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate an ex ante efficiency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfying this axiom. These solutions are generalizations of the monotone path solutions. Adding individual rationality yields a subclass of these solutions. By employing maximin efficiency and an invariance property that implies individual rationality, a new axiomatization of the monotone path solutions is obtained. Furthermore, we examine the consequences of employing efficiency axioms based on alternative decision criteria.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)489-502
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume19
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2002

Cite this