Efficient Priority Rules

L.H. Ehlers; B.E. Klaus

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.009

Efficient Priority Rules

L.H. Ehlers^*
, B.E. Klaus

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	372-384
Number of pages	13
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	55
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.009
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2006

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AB - We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

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M3 - Article

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EP - 384

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

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Efficient Priority Rules

Abstract

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