Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

W. Bossert, J. Derks, H. Peters

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Abstract

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)12-23
Number of pages12
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume50
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2005

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