Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

W. Bossert; J. Derks; H. Peters

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.010

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

W. Bossert, J. Derks, H. Peters^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	12-23
Number of pages	12
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	50
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.010
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2005

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title = "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games",

abstract = "A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.",

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AB - A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

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JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

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Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

Abstract

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