Effectivity and Power

Dominik Karos, Hans Peters

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

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We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions,
both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political games.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda

JEL classifications

  • c71 - Cooperative Games


  • Effectivity Function
  • Power Index

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