Abstract
We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions,
both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political games.
both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political games.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Publication series
| Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
|---|---|
| Number | 034 |
JEL classifications
- c71 - Cooperative Games
Keywords
- Effectivity Function
- Power Index