Economic Informality and Security Policy Preferences in Mexico and Latin America

Economic informality undermines the social contract by which governments provide security and welfare goods in exchange for citizens’ support and taxation. Informal workers are less likely to pay taxes and be covered by social-security institutions and more likely to be victimized by both criminals and security officials. This makes them insensitive to whether security policies are punitive or preventative but more likely to support citizen-led over government-led security policies. Analysis of data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) finds that informal workers are more likely to suffer crime victimization and to pay bribes to security forces; they are also less trusting of the police, military and judiciary. As for security policies, informal workers are more likely to support vigilantism to tackle crime. A survey experiment in Mexico reveals that informal workers are insensitive to treatments that affect other citizens’ preferences for reallocation of security spending from the military to other security policies. Our chapter speaks to both the causes and consequences of unequal security. Informal workers receive less protection from the state, which affects their security policy preferences. The implementation of policies they support—such as vigilantism—will likely deepen inequalities, however: Those more able to defend themselves will enjoy greater security.