Research Output per year
This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.
Bos, I., Pot, E. A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P., 1 Jan 2010, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 6 p. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 030).
Research output: Working paper › Professional
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Bos, I., Peeters, R. J. A. P., & Pot, E. A. (2013). Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms? Applied Economics Letters, 20(6), 611-614. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.725925