Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?

I. Bos, R.J.A.P. Peeters, E.A. Pot

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)611-614
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Volume20
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013

Research Output

  • 1 Working paper

Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?

Bos, I., Pot, E. A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P., 1 Jan 2010, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 6 p. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 030).

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