Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?

I. Bos; R.J.A.P. Peeters; E.A. Pot

doi:10.1080/13504851.2012.725925

Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?

I. Bos, R.J.A.P. Peeters^*, E.A. Pot

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	611-614
Journal	Applied Economics Letters
Volume	20
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.725925
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2013

Access to Document

10.1080/13504851.2012.725925

1 Working paper

Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?
Bos, I., Pot, E. A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P., 1 Jan 2010, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 6 p. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 030).
Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

Open Access
File

194 Downloads (Pure)

Cite this

@article{adcb67e4d41b4c5a9d270cb375492318,

title = "Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?",

abstract = "This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.",

author = "I. Bos and R.J.A.P. Peeters and E.A. Pot",

year = "2013",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1080/13504851.2012.725925",

language = "English",

volume = "20",

pages = "611--614",

journal = "Applied Economics Letters",

issn = "1350-4851",