@article{adcb67e4d41b4c5a9d270cb375492318,
title = "Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?",
abstract = "This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.",
author = "I. Bos and R.J.A.P. Peeters and E.A. Pot",
year = "2013",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1080/13504851.2012.725925",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "611--614",
journal = "Applied Economics Letters",
issn = "1350-4851",
publisher = "Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group",
number = "6",
}