Dividing justly in bargaining problems with claims: Normative judgments and actual negotiations

S. Gaechter, A.M. Riedl*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people’s impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people’s judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the ‘constrained equal-award’ solution.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)571-594
Number of pages23
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume27
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006

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