Delegated Expertise: When are good projects bad news?

E. Feess; M. Walzl

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2003.05.001

Delegated Expertise: When are good projects bad news?

E. Feess^*, M. Walzl

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We analyze a model of delegated expertise with limited liability where the agent's information depends on his unobservable effort. The principal's profit may decrease in the percentage of good projects if and only if the agent has private information.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	77-82
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	2004
Issue number	82
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.05.001
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2004

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10.1016/j.econlet.2003.05.001

Cite this

@article{ee1bdd0a809243d3ad2043e26d50082c,

title = "Delegated Expertise: When are good projects bad news?",

abstract = "We analyze a model of delegated expertise with limited liability where the agent's information depends on his unobservable effort. The principal's profit may decrease in the percentage of good projects if and only if the agent has private information.",

author = "E. Feess and M. Walzl",

year = "2004",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2003.05.001",

language = "English",

volume = "2004",

pages = "77--82",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",