Abstract
This paper analyzes the important role played by so-called Bug hunters in promoting cyber security. It is argued that as a result of high pressure on these very dynamic markets vulnerabilities are , unfortunately, unavoidable given the tens of millions of lines that every program code contains. There is therefore a risk that malicious individuals would try to discover the vulnerabilities and seek to gain benefit from them. The paper provides a detailed Economic Analysis of the incentives of the bug hunters as a collective group, assuming that they make a rational choices between the so-called white, gray and black markets. The paper argues that the choice of the bug hunter depends on a variety of elements, such as the legality of the market transaction, the price offered for the vulnerability and the role of intermediaries. The paper more particularly points at the important role of those intermediaries who could have pervert incentives to prefer the black market. The paper therefor argues that regulation is necessary, as well as international cooperation, to remedy those market failures.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Maastricht |
| Publisher | Maastricht University Press |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 3 Mar 2026 |
Publication series
| Series | Maastricht LAW Research Paper Series |
|---|---|
| Number | 1 |
| Volume | 2026 |
JEL classifications
- k19 - Basic Areas of Law: Other
- k24 - Cyber Law
Keywords
- artificial intelligence
- internet of things
- bug hunting
- vulnerabilities
- cybersecurity
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Dive into the research topics of 'Deciphering Bug hunters – A Law and Economics Perspective'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Research output
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Deciphering Bug hunters – A Law and Economics Perspective
Faure, M. G. & Jiang, J., 1 Mar 2026, In: European Journal of Risk Regulation. 17, 1, p. 182-199Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review
Open Access
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