Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games

J Flesch; F Thuijsman; K Vrieze

doi:10.1007/BF01263273

Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games

J Flesch^*, F Thuijsman, K Vrieze

^*Corresponding author for this work

Networks and Strategic Optimization

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Abstract

We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary e-equilibria (e > 0) do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	303-314
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	26
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01263273
Publication status	Published - 1997

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title = "Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games",

abstract = "We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary e-equilibria (e > 0) do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.",

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AU - Flesch, J

AU - Thuijsman, F

AU - Vrieze, K

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AB - We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary e-equilibria (e > 0) do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.

U2 - 10.1007/BF01263273

DO - 10.1007/BF01263273

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-7276

VL - 26

SP - 303

EP - 314

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

IS - 3

ER -

Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games

Abstract

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