@techreport{3a0069c67eca46c6ab33c70fdb9a1d3c,
title = "Costless delay in negotiations",
abstract = "We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions are necessary for SSPE but insufficient because these equations can be singular. Strategy profiles excluding perpetual disagreement guarantee non-singularity. The necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of stationary best responses additionally require either an equalizing condition or a minimality condition. Quasi SSPE only satisfy the recursive equations and optimality conditions. These always exist and are SSPE if either all equalizing conditions or all minimality conditions hold.",
author = "P.J.J. Herings and H Houba",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.26481/umagsb.2015002",
language = "English",
series = "GSBE Research Memoranda",
publisher = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
number = "002",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
}