Costless delay in negotiations

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Abstract

We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions are necessary for SSPE but insufficient because these equations can be singular. Strategy profiles excluding perpetual disagreement guarantee non-singularity. The necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of stationary best responses additionally require either an equalizing condition or a minimality condition. Quasi SSPE only satisfy the recursive equations and optimality conditions. These always exist and are SSPE if either all equalizing conditions or all minimality conditions hold.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMaastricht
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number002

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