Correlated-belief equilibrium

Elias Tsakas*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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We introduce a new solution concept, called correlated-belief equilibrium. The difference to nash equilibrium is that, while each player has correct marginal conjectures about each opponent, it is not necessarily the case that these marginal conjectures are independent. Then, we provide an epistemic foundation and we relate correlated-belief equilibrium with standard solution concepts, such as rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and conjectural equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)757-779
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2016


  • Correlated beliefs
  • Product measures
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Conjectural equilibrium
  • I-consistency

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