Core concepts for incomplete market economies

H. Habis, P.J.J. Herings

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core, the Strong Sequential Core, and the Weak Sequential Core. Except for the Classical Core, all these concepts can be defined by requiring the absence of blocking in period 0 and at any date-event in period 1. The concepts only differ with respect to the notion of blocking in period 0. To evaluate these concepts, we study three market structures in detail: strongly complete markets, incomplete markets in finance economies, and incomplete markets in settings with multiple commodities. Even when markets are strongly complete, the Classical Core is argued not to be an appropriate concept. For the general case of incomplete markets, the Weak Sequential Core is the only concept that does not suffer from major defects. 

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)595-609
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume47
Issue number4-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2011

Keywords

  • Incomplete markets
  • Dynamic core concepts
  • Time and uncertainty
  • 2-PERIOD ECONOMIES
  • SEQUENTIAL CORE
  • ASSET MARKET
  • EQUILIBRIUM
  • OPTIMALITY

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