Core concepts for Dynamic TU Games

L. Kranich, A. Perea ý Monsuwé, H.J.M. Peters

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The differences between the concepts arise from different interpretations of profitable deviations by coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general and of the weak sequential core for the case of two players. Simplifying characterizations of the weak and strong sequential core are provided. Examples highlight the essential difference between these core concepts.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)43-61
JournalInternational Game Theory Review
Volume7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2005

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