Cooperative games describe situations where players collaborate in coalitions and generate profits. Cooperative game theory analyses how to allocate profits generated by the grand coalition among the players in a fair way, and provides several significant solutions. This thesis introduces a new class of cooperative games, and studies explicit expressions of these solutions in this class. Moreover, these solutions are characterized using the axiomatic method. Next, this thesis focuses on non-cooperative games and mechanism design. Based on a sequential partition method, this thesis gives a new non-cooperative interpretation of the constrained equal awards rule for bankruptcy problems. Then, a particular mechanism is considered to solve division problems with single-dipped preferences. The Pareto optimal Nash and strong equilibria coincide and assign Pareto optimal allocations that are characterized by so-called maximal coalitions: non-involved agents prefer getting zero over an equal coalition share, whereas for agents in the coalition the opposite holds.
|Award date||27 Sept 2022|
|Place of Publication||Maastricht|
|Publication status||Published - 2022|
- cooperative game
- axiomatic analysis
- division problems