Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

P. Csóka, P.J.J. Herings, L.Á. Kóczy, M. Pintér

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (ntu). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set.convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider five generalizations of convexity in the ntu setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be unified under ntu exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not ntu exact.finally, we relate the classes of p-balanced, totally p-balanced, ntu exact, totally ntu exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)57-62
Number of pages6
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume209
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2011

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