Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility

P. Csóka, P.J.J. Herings, L.Á. Kóczy, M. Pintér

Research output: Working paperProfessional

8 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility
(NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and
marginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of ∏-balanced, totally ∏-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMaastricht
PublisherMaastricht University School of Business and Economics
Number of pages19
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2009

Publication series

SeriesMETEOR Research Memorandum
Number031

JEL classifications

  • c71 - Cooperative Games

Keywords

  • NTU Games
  • Exact Games
  • Convex games

Cite this

Csóka, P., Herings, P. J. J., Kóczy, L. Á., & Pintér, M. (2009). Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility. Maastricht University School of Business and Economics. METEOR Research Memorandum, No. 031 https://doi.org/10.26481/umamet/2009031