Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard

Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

236 Downloads (Pure)

Series	MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum Series
Number	037
ISSN	2666-982X

Access to Document

@techreport{195d427fd1464fc787fdbc7e87e2373c,

title = "Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard",

author = "T.H.W. Ziesemer",

year = "2001",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.26481/umamer.2001037",

language = "English",

series = "MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum Series",

publisher = "UNU-MERIT",

number = "037",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "UNU-MERIT",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard

AU - Ziesemer, T.H.W.

PY - 2001/1/1

Y1 - 2001/1/1

U2 - 10.26481/umamer.2001037

DO - 10.26481/umamer.2001037

M3 - Working paper

T3 - MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum Series

BT - Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard

PB - UNU-MERIT

CY - Maastricht

ER -