Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard

T.H.W. Ziesemer

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMaastricht
PublisherUNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology
Number of pages15
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2001

Publication series

SeriesMERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum Series
Number037
ISSN2666-982X

Cite this

Ziesemer, T. H. W. (2001). Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard. UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology. MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum Series, No. 037