Contests with Endogenous Deadlines

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the problem of a contest designer who chooses a starting time and a deadline of the contest to maximize discounted total effort by the contestants. Each contestant secretly decides how much effort to exert between the starting time and the deadline. At the deadline, the contestant who exerted most effort wins a prize, which consists of the endowment of the designer and collected interest. The contest has a unique Nash equilibrium. In the main model, the designer should announce the contest immediately with a short deadline to promote intense competition. I analyze how the optimal starting time and deadline change for a variable contest prize, different types of asymmetries, a Tullock lottery contest success function, and different goal functions of the designer.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)119-133
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economics & Management Strategy
Volume27
Issue number1
Early online date2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2018

Keywords

  • ALL-PAY AUCTION
  • ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS
  • HEAD STARTS
  • COMPLETE INFORMATION
  • CONTINUOUS-TIME
  • ATTRITION
  • CAPS
  • WAR
  • COSTS

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