Constructive ambiguity or stringent monitoring? Towards understanding UN Security Council oversight over non-UN-led forces

the united nations security council’s (unsc) oversight over mandate implementation by the regional organizations and coalitions it authorizes is strongly characterized by processes of selectivity. Yet, little is known about these processes. Why is the stringency of these reporting requirements so diverse? and why is compliance to these reporting requirements deemed more important in one case, while less in the other? this article illustrates the analytical added value of the principal-agent model for answering these questions. Based upon the model’s transaction-cost logic, it is argued that the unsc’s oversight efforts are likely determined by the characteristics of the agent and the mere preference constellation among the permanent members. Based upon a set of interviews conducted at the various representations to the un, it is argued that the unsc is neither always able, nor always willing to install stringent monitoring upon non-un-led forces.