Consistent House Allocation

L.H. Ehlers, B.E. Klaus

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except – maybe – for up to three agents in each object’s priority ordering.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)561-574
Number of pages14
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume30
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2007

Cite this