### Abstract

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the division of payoffs to agents is flexible as part of the solution. We take a similar approach to one-sided assignment problems as sasaki (int j game theory 24:373–397, 1995) for two-sided assignment problems, and we analyze various desirable properties of solutions including consistency and weak pairwise-monotonicity. We show that for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems (i.e., the subset of one-sided assignment problems with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [pareto indifference and consistency] or [invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and consistency], then it coincides with the core (theorems 1 and 2). However, we also prove that on the class of all one-sided assignment problems (solvable or not), no solution satisfies consistency and coincides with the core whenever the core is non-empty (theorem 4). Finally, we comment on the difficulty in obtaining further positive results for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems in line with sasaki’s (1995) characterizations of the core for two-sided assignment problems.

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 415-433 |

Number of pages | 18 |

Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |

Volume | 35 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2010 |

## Cite this

Klaus, B. E., & Nichifor, A. (2010). Consistency in One-Sided Assignment Games.

*Social Choice and Welfare*,*35*, 415-433. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0447-8