Congestion games viewed from M-convexity

S. Fujishige; M. Goemans; T. Harks; B. Peis; R. Zenklusen

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2015.04.002

Congestion games viewed from M-convexity

S. Fujishige^*, M. Goemans, T. Harks, B. Peis, R. Zenklusen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Congestion games have extensively been studied till recently. It is shown by Fotakis (2010) that for every congestion game on an extension-parallel network, any best-response sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium of the game in n steps, where n is the number of players. We show that the fast convergence of best-response sequences results from M-convexity (of Murota (1996)) of the potential function associated with the game. We also give a characterization of M-convex functions in terms of greedy algorithms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	329-333
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	43
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.04.002
Publication status	Published - May 2015

Keywords

Congestion games
Discrete convexity
Best-response dynamics
M-convex function
FUNCTION MINIMIZATION
STRONG EQUILIBRIUM

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title = "Congestion games viewed from M-convexity",

abstract = "Congestion games have extensively been studied till recently. It is shown by Fotakis (2010) that for every congestion game on an extension-parallel network, any best-response sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium of the game in n steps, where n is the number of players. We show that the fast convergence of best-response sequences results from M-convexity (of Murota (1996)) of the potential function associated with the game. We also give a characterization of M-convex functions in terms of greedy algorithms.",

keywords = "Congestion games, Discrete convexity, Best-response dynamics, M-convex function, FUNCTION MINIMIZATION, STRONG EQUILIBRIUM",

author = "S. Fujishige and M. Goemans and T. Harks and B. Peis and R. Zenklusen",

year = "2015",

month = may,

doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2015.04.002",

language = "English",

volume = "43",

pages = "329--333",

journal = "Operations Research Letters",

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T1 - Congestion games viewed from M-convexity

AU - Fujishige, S.

AU - Goemans, M.

AU - Harks, T.

AU - Peis, B.

AU - Zenklusen, R.

PY - 2015/5

Y1 - 2015/5

N2 - Congestion games have extensively been studied till recently. It is shown by Fotakis (2010) that for every congestion game on an extension-parallel network, any best-response sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium of the game in n steps, where n is the number of players. We show that the fast convergence of best-response sequences results from M-convexity (of Murota (1996)) of the potential function associated with the game. We also give a characterization of M-convex functions in terms of greedy algorithms.

AB - Congestion games have extensively been studied till recently. It is shown by Fotakis (2010) that for every congestion game on an extension-parallel network, any best-response sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium of the game in n steps, where n is the number of players. We show that the fast convergence of best-response sequences results from M-convexity (of Murota (1996)) of the potential function associated with the game. We also give a characterization of M-convex functions in terms of greedy algorithms.

KW - Congestion games

KW - Discrete convexity

KW - Best-response dynamics

KW - M-convex function

KW - FUNCTION MINIMIZATION

KW - STRONG EQUILIBRIUM

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2015.04.002

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2015.04.002

M3 - Article

SN - 0167-6377

VL - 43

SP - 329

EP - 333

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Congestion games viewed from M-convexity

Abstract

Keywords

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