Condorcet versus participation criterion in social welfare rules

Burak Can, Emre Ergin, Mohsen Pourpouneh

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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Abstract

Moulin (1988) shows that there exists no social choice rule, that satisfies the following two criteria at the same time: the Condorcet criterion and the participation criterion, a.k.a., No Show Paradox. We extend these criteria to social welfare rules, i.e., rules that choose rankings for each preference profile. We show that the impossibility does not hold, and one particular rule, the Kemeny rule satisfies both the Condorcet and the participation criteria.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 14 Sep 2017

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number020

JEL classifications

  • d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"

Keywords

  • condorcet criterion
  • participation criterion
  • social choice rules
  • social welfare rules

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