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Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games
T. Harks
*
, M. Hoefer
, M. Klimm
, A. Skopalik
*
Corresponding author for this work
Quantitative Economics
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Keyphrases
Pure Nash Equilibrium
100%
Matroid
100%
Network Congestion Games
100%
Improvement Dynamics
100%
Strong Equilibrium
100%
Single Commodity
66%
Polynomial Time
33%
Nash Equilibrium
33%
Network Routing
33%
Resilience
33%
Hardness Results
33%
Computational Complexity
33%
Approximate Equilibrium
33%
Centralized Algorithm
33%
Strong NP-hardness
33%
INIS
equilibrium
100%
dynamics
42%
polynomials
28%
commodities
28%
algorithms
14%
applications
14%
approximations
14%
convergence
14%
routing
14%
hardness
14%
Computer Science
Nash Equilibrium
100%
Polynomial Time
50%
Network Routing
50%
Computational Complexity
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Congestion Game
100%
Nash Equilibrium
66%