Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats

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Abstract

In the theoretical literature on the authority of international secretariats, academics often dichotomize between states and secretariats. Even when they account for the fact that states are often divided, they normally adopt a two-step approach: states first resolve their own differences before they entertain relations with secretariats. This article provides an alternative perspective. It argues that individual or groups of states may collude with like-minded secretariats to achieve outcomes at the expense of other states. Working informally together is beneficial. States can benefit from the rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert authority of secretariats. States and secretariats can also exchange resources. The article illustrates this perspective through two case studies: the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 and the European Union's military operation in Chad in 2008.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)601-618
Number of pages18
JournalGlobal Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations
Volume23
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2017

Keywords

  • international secretariats
  • authority
  • principal-agent model
  • POWER
  • LEADERSHIP
  • DELEGATION
  • NATO

Cite this

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title = "Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats",
abstract = "In the theoretical literature on the authority of international secretariats, academics often dichotomize between states and secretariats. Even when they account for the fact that states are often divided, they normally adopt a two-step approach: states first resolve their own differences before they entertain relations with secretariats. This article provides an alternative perspective. It argues that individual or groups of states may collude with like-minded secretariats to achieve outcomes at the expense of other states. Working informally together is beneficial. States can benefit from the rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert authority of secretariats. States and secretariats can also exchange resources. The article illustrates this perspective through two case studies: the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 and the European Union's military operation in Chad in 2008.",
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Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats. / Dijkstra, Hylke.

In: Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 23, No. 4, 01.10.2017, p. 601-618.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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