Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information

S. Khare; T. Storcken

doi:10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2

Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information

S. Khare^*
, T. Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some partial order. This partial order might differ for different individuals. Necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated under which these restricted domains admit unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial choice rules.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	585-604
Number of pages	20
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	59
Issue number	3
Early online date	2 Apr 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2
Publication status	Published - Oct 2022

Keywords

STRATEGY-PROOFNESS

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Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information

Abstract

Keywords

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