Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information

S. Khare*, T. Storcken

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some partial order. This partial order might differ for different individuals. Necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated under which these restricted domains admit unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial choice rules.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)585-604
Number of pages20
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume59
Issue number3
Early online date2 Apr 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2022

Keywords

  • STRATEGY-PROOFNESS

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