Abstract
We show that feasible elimination procedures (peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also show that the problem of determining whether a specific k-tuple can result from a feasible elimination procedure is computationally equivalent to the problem of finding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 254-261 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 103 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - May 2017 |
JEL classifications
- c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
Keywords
- Feasible elimination procedure
- Choosing k from m
- Axiomatization
- Computation
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