Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered

Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

We show that feasible elimination procedures (peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also show that the problem of determining whether a specific k-tuple can result from a feasible elimination procedure is computationally equivalent to the problem of finding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)254-261
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume103
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2017

JEL classifications

  • c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
  • d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"

Keywords

  • Feasible elimination procedure
  • Choosing k from m
  • Axiomatization
  • Computation

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