Charles de Gaulle and the Grand Coalition's Ostpolitik, 1966-1969

The West German Grand Coalition, headed by Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt (SPD) took office in November 1966 in the changing international context of détente. The reluctance of the former German government of Ludwig Erhard to engage in dialogue with Eastern Europe had been a constant source of Franco-German disagreements from 1963 to 1966. The arrival of the Grand Coalition, eager to implement a more pro-active, French-inspired détente policy, positively altered the dynamics of bilateral relations. Ostpolitik was a key element of the new Franco-German entente and of the reactivation of dialogue between Paris and Bonn. Brandt was the main promoter of the rapprochement with the French on Ostpolitik. Based on extensive multi-archival research conducted in France and Germany, this paper reassesses Franco-German interactions and dynamics in the context of East-West détente in the second half of the 1960s. It argues that, despite a superficial rapprochement, a common Franco-German Ostpolitik, as envisioned in the early days of the Grand Coalition, could not be implemented. This article first examines the similitude(s) and difference(s) in General de Gaulle's and the Grand Coalition's conception of détente and Ostpolitik. It then analyzes the reactions of the French government to the German government's early initiatives and explores de Gaulle's reasons for supporting Brandt's attempts at laying the foundations for a new German policy toward Eastern Europe and for a new approach of Germany's reunification. This paper furthermore illustrates the evolution of the attitude on both sides of the Rhine and the ever more obvious limits of the Franco-German collaboration on Ostpolitik-related issues. Finally, it assesses the political relevance of bilateral collaboration in this area.