Cautious reasoning in psychological games

Niels Mourmans

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper


Caution is an integral part of many solution concepts in traditional game theory and is commonly modelled using lexicographic beliefs. We show here that lexicographic beliefs lack the expressive power to model caution once we extend traditional games to psychological games. Quantification of the relation of ‘deeming an event infinitely more likely than another event’ is necessary, which can be accomplished by using non-standard beliefs.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEPICENTER (Research Center for Epistemic Game Theory)
Number of pages12
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Publication series

SeriesEPICENTER Working Paper

JEL classifications

  • c72 - Noncooperative Games
  • d03 - Behavioral Economics: Underlying Principles
  • d83 - "Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief"


  • Lexicographic beliefs
  • Non-standard beliefs
  • Psychological games
  • Epistemic game theory

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