Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

B.E. Klaus; D. Dimitrov; C.J. Haake

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.045

Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

B.E. Klaus^*, D. Dimitrov, C.J. Haake

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents' preferences are additive, no such rule exists.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	106-110
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	93
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.045
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2006

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title = "Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods",

abstract = "We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents' preferences are additive, no such rule exists.",

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JO - Economics Letters

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Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

Abstract

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