@inproceedings{a5acae232cdc43f7b1dd2e8f3ba5910b,
title = "Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains",
abstract = "Schummer [27] introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome.this work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for this setting. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: for several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.",
author = "Mat{\'u}s Mihal{\'a}k and Paolo Penna and Peter Widmayer",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3\_23",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783662533536",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "289--301",
editor = "Martin Gairing and Rahul Savani",
booktitle = "Algorithmic Game Theory - 9th International Symposium, SAGT 2016, Proceedings",
address = "United States",
}