### Abstract

Schummer [27] introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome.this work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for this setting. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: for several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.

Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proc. 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) |

Publisher | Springer |

Pages | 289-301 |

Number of pages | 13 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - 2016 |

### Publication series

Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
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Volume | 9928 |

## Cite this

Mihalák, M., Penna, P., & Widmayer, P. (2016). Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains. In

*Proc. 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*(pp. 289-301). Springer. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.. 9928 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_23