Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

Matús Mihalák, Paolo Penna, Peter Widmayer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Schummer [27] introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome.this work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for this setting. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: for several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProc. 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)
PublisherSpringer
Pages289-301
Number of pages13
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Publication series

SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume9928

Cite this

Mihalák, M., Penna, P., & Widmayer, P. (2016). Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains. In Proc. 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (pp. 289-301). Springer. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.. 9928 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_23