Abstract
Many of today’s problems revolve around distance and proximity. Progres sives argue that a universalist, inclusive ethics requires us to bridge distan ces in identity, space, and time. Conservatives object that such bridging is psychologically unrealistic: people of flesh and blood can only care about whom/what is closeby. Evolutionary and psychological research seems to corroborate this sobering view. Many researchers confirm that our intuitions (‘System 1’) are groupish and shortsighted, and largely deaf to the appeal of rational universalism (‘System 2’).
But not all agree. We distinguish four ‘evoprogressive’ attempts to reconcile evolution and psychology with a universalist, inclusive ethics. Singer and Pinker (1), Buchanan and Powell (2), and Sunstein (3) contend that a reason based, inclusive ethics is psychologically feasible, but that such an ethics has to be thin, solely focusing on rights and noharm. By contrast, Haidt (4) argues that an inclusive ethics should be ‘broad’, also encompassing moral domains like sacrality, loyalty and authority. This implies for him that it cannot be reasonbased.
We argue that a broad form of inclusive ethics can and should be reason based, but that this requires a rethinking of ‘reason’. We show that the evoprogressives’ conviction that a rational ethics is by definition thin, results from their theoreticistic conception of reason. But reason can also have more mimeticembodied or mythicalnarrative forms. These do allow or a broad, rational, inclusive ethics that can motivate real people to include stakeholders that are distant in identity, place, and time.
But not all agree. We distinguish four ‘evoprogressive’ attempts to reconcile evolution and psychology with a universalist, inclusive ethics. Singer and Pinker (1), Buchanan and Powell (2), and Sunstein (3) contend that a reason based, inclusive ethics is psychologically feasible, but that such an ethics has to be thin, solely focusing on rights and noharm. By contrast, Haidt (4) argues that an inclusive ethics should be ‘broad’, also encompassing moral domains like sacrality, loyalty and authority. This implies for him that it cannot be reasonbased.
We argue that a broad form of inclusive ethics can and should be reason based, but that this requires a rethinking of ‘reason’. We show that the evoprogressives’ conviction that a rational ethics is by definition thin, results from their theoreticistic conception of reason. But reason can also have more mimeticembodied or mythicalnarrative forms. These do allow or a broad, rational, inclusive ethics that can motivate real people to include stakeholders that are distant in identity, place, and time.
Translated title of the contribution | Broad Morality and broad reason: Reconciling inclusive ethics with psychological realism |
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Original language | Dutch |
Pages (from-to) | 2-36 |
Number of pages | 35 |
Journal | Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte |
Volume | 114 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Keywords
- Dual Process Theory; inclusive ethics; reason; conservatism and progressivism; evolution theory