Bisection Auctions

P.J.J. Herings; R.J. Müller; A.J. Vermeulen

doi:10.1145/1598780.1598786

Bisection Auctions

P.J.J. Herings, R.J. Müller, A.J. Vermeulen

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Abstract

In this note we give a survey of bisection auctions. Bisection auctions have been introduced in order to reduce the number of rounds and increase privacy of information in iterative implementations of Vickrey auctions. First, we present the case of discrete valuations. we discuss the strategic properties of this auction and recent results which show that--for 2 bidders--the auction dominates in a particular sense any other auction with respect to the number of bits revealed. For the case of continuous valuations we contrast its properties with the result that no practical query auction can achieve full efficiency in ex-post equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-5
Number of pages	5
Journal	ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Volume	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1598780.1598786
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2009

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10.1145/1598780.1598786

Cite this

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