Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment

R.J.A.P. Peeters, M. Vorsatz, M. Walzl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory experiment with a constant-sum sender-receiver game and a sequential game of matching pennies with the same payoff structure to investigate the impact of individuals’ first- and second-order beliefs on truth-telling. While first-movers in matching pennies choose an action at random, senders in the sender-receiver game tell the truth more often than they lie. Since second-order beliefs are uncorrelated with actions in both games, excessive truth-telling is unlikely to be driven by guilt aversion or preferences for truth-telling that are based on second-order beliefs; preferences for truth-telling per-se, on the other hand, cannot be rejected.

data source: no data
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume113
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2015

Keywords

  • Experiment
  • Sender-receiver games
  • Strategic information transmission
  • Belief elicitation
  • Guilt aversion
  • STRATEGIC INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION
  • SENDER-RECEIVER GAMES
  • DECEPTION
  • PROMISES
  • GUILT
  • COMMUNICATION
  • INDIVIDUALS
  • RULES

Cite this