Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment with a constant-sum sender-receiver game and a sequential game of matching pennies with the same payoff structure to investigate the impact of individuals’ first- and second-order beliefs on truth-telling. While first-movers in matching pennies choose an action at random, senders in the sender-receiver game tell the truth more often than they lie. Since second-order beliefs are uncorrelated with actions in both games, excessive truth-telling is unlikely to be driven by guilt aversion or preferences for truth-telling that are based on second-order beliefs; preferences for truth-telling per-se, on the other hand, cannot be rejected.
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Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-12 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Volume | 113 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2015 |
Keywords
- Experiment
- Sender-receiver games
- Strategic information transmission
- Belief elicitation
- Guilt aversion
- STRATEGIC INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION
- SENDER-RECEIVER GAMES
- DECEPTION
- PROMISES
- GUILT
- COMMUNICATION
- INDIVIDUALS
- RULES